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COMMENTS
MUCH ADO ABOUT MIGHTY LITTLE - NORTH
CAROLINA AND THE APPLICATION OF THE
RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE TO
ENCROACHMENTS OF PERMANENT STRUCTURES
ON THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
INTRODUCTION
It was to be an ordinary property transaction much like any
other transaction to buy or sell land. The landowner thought eve-
rything was in order and the sale would close without problems.
The buyer requested a lot survey.' The survey revealed the adjoin-
ing landowner's home had been partially built on the property.2
This encroachment prevented the closing.3 Ironically, earlier in the
chain of title the original landowner held title to both properties.4
The owner brought an action in trespass against the encroaching
landowner.5 The court held the encroachment a continuing tres-
pass and granted a mandatory injunction to compel removal as a
matter of law.6
In good faith, a landowner constructed a two-story brick
apartment building on his land. Nine years later the landowner
learned his building encroached one foot on the adjoining neigh-
bor's property." Upon learning of the encroachment, the landowner
approached his neighbor to discuss acceptable solutions to the
1. Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 381, 311 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1984),
disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984).
2. Id. at 382, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 381, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
5. Id. at 380, 311 S.E.2d at 299.
6. Id. at 390, 311 S.E.2d at 304.
7. Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 666
(1986).
8. Id. at 382, 346 S.E.2d at 667.
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problem.' The neighbor offered to sell the one-third acre to the
landowner for forty-five thousand dollars.10 The landowner de-
clined the offer.1' The neighbor brought an action in trespass
against the landowner.12 The court held the encroachment was a
continuing trespass and granted a mandatory injunction to compel
removal as a matter of law. 3
"[Each] case involves mighty little, but [each] has given the
parties and the Court a great deal of trouble."14 An encroachment
on the land of another usually involves a small quantity of land. 5
However, the encroachment frequently creates mighty problems
for courts and the parties.' If an encroachment was a mistake
made in good faith, does a defendant have any recourse? What fac-
tors do the courts consider in determining an appropriate remedy?
Should courts grant a mandatory injunction to compel removal as
a matter of law? Is there a viable alternative to the standard rem-
edy of mandatory injunctions to compel removal? This paper will
address the problems these issues have presented to the courts and
the parties.
An encroachment is an illegal intrusion upon the lands, prop-
9. Id. at 379, 346 S.E.2d at 666.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 378, 346 S.E.2d at 666.
13. Id. at 384, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
14. North v. Bunn, 128 N.C. 196, 198, 38 S.E. 814 (1901). The case involved
an encroachment of the corner of a house on the adjoining landowner's property.
Chief Justice Furches began the court's opinion with this statement.)
15. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (Building encroached fifty feet on plaintiffs right of way); O'Neal v.
Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937) (wharf extended 3.8 feet onto riparian
rights of plaintiff); Leaksville Woolen Mills Co. v. Spray Water Power & Land
Co., 183 N.C. 511, 112 S.E. 24 (1922) (embankment constructed twenty feet in
length upon plaintiff's driveway); Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C.
App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986) (two-story brick apartment building encroached
one foot); Bishop v. Reinhold 66 N.C. App. 379, 331 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. re-
view denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984) (house encroached fifty feet on
plaintiff's lot).
16. See, e.g. O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E 688 (1937) (granting a
mandatory injunction to compel removal of a wharf which extended 3.8 feet onto
riparian rights of plaintiff); Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378,
346 S.E.2d 665 (1986) (granting a mandatory injunction to compel removal of a
two-story building which encroached one foot); Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App.
379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700
(1984) (granting a mandatory injunction to compel removal of a house which en-
croached fifty feet on a vacant lot).
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erty, or authority of another. 17 The courts have characterized en-
croachments as either renewing, continuing, or permanent tres-
passes.18 Historically, North Carolina courts applied the law of
continuing trespass to permanent structure encroachments.1 9 Ap-
plying the law of continuing trespass allows the true landowner an
election of remedies.20 The landowner can elect to keep the struc-
ture and pay its fair value to the builder or demand that the
builder remove the structure and recover only actual damages to
the land.2 Courts determine the appropriate remedy, damages or
removal of the structure.22 In any equity action, courts consider
the relative hardships to each party and the equities between
them.2 3 Recent North Carolina decisions purport to consider the
relative hardships of the parties in determining the appropriate
remedy.24 The courts apply the relative hardship test in cases seek-
ing a temporary restraining order or interlocutory injunction. 25
However, courts fail to directly apply the test in cases seeking
mandatory injunction to compel removal of a permanent
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 473 (5th ed. 1979). Encroachment as used in
this paper is limited to an intrusion by an adjoining landowner onto the property
of his neighbor by a permanent structure such as a house, dam, or wharf. It is
presupposed that the adjoining landowner entitled to a remedy holds clear or su-
perior title to the property in dispute. Cases dealing with encroachments upon
easements will be included, but cases dealing with public lands or public rights
will not be addressed.
18. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.4 (1973).
19. See O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937); Kinsland v.
Kinsland, 188 N.C. 810, 125 S.E. 625 (1924); Williams v. South & South Rentals,
82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986); Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379,
311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984);
Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 58 N.C. App. 506, 294 S.E.2d 23 (1982); Thomp-
son v. Hayes, 17 N.C. App. 216, 193 S.E.2d 488 (1972); Terry v. Jim Walter Corp.,
8 N.C. App. 637, 175 S.E.2d 354 (1970).
20. Terry v. Jim Walter Corp., 8 N.C. App. 637, 642, 175 S.E.2d 354, 357
(1970).
21. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina Part I. The Substantive
Law, 47 N.C.L. REV. 31, 61 (1968) [hereinafter Dobbs, Substantive Law].
22. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, at § 5.6.
23. Id.
24. See Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc., 316 N.C. 475, 342 S.E.2d 832
(1986); Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953); Lance v.
Cogdill, 238 N.C. 500, 78 S.E.2d 319 (1953); Williams v. South & South Rentals,
82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986); Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379,
311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984).
25. See Huskins, at 357, 78 S.E.2d at 116 (1953); Lance, at 500, 78 S.E.2d at
319 (1953).
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structure.2 6
This paper presents a legal argument for the application of the
relative hardship test in all actions based on the encroachment of
permanent structures on the land of another. First, the doctrine of
relative hardship is presented. Second, this paper reviews the cases
handed down by the North Carolina courts which have applied or
discussed the application of the relative hardship test. Finally, this
paper recommends the application of the relative hardship test as
the most objective standard for determining an appropriate rem-
edy where a mandatory injunction to compel removal is an issue.
RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE - THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES
The defendant invested several million dollars in a condomin-
ium.2 7 He surveyed the land before the structure was built. A com-
plete title search was done. A mistake was made in the ground sur-
vey. Consequently the defendant built the structure a fraction of a
foot over his boundary line. A plaintiff in this situation has the
option of requesting a mandatory injunction to compel removal.28
However, removal of the structure would cost the defendant a
great deal and would result in little benefit to the plaintiff.29
Should the plaintiff be protected by injunctive relief regardless of
the cost to the defendant or should a less drastic form of relief be
granted by the court?
A. In General
Injunctions are issued, not as a matter of right, but in the
courts' discretion." In any equity action, it is proper to consider
the balance of convenience or relative hardships of the parties
before granting or denying injunctive relief.3 1 Balancing the equi-
ties is a doctrine commonly invoked in encroachment cases.2
Courts will deny equitable relief to the aggrieved party in favor of
26. See Clark at 475, 342 S.E.2d at 832, Williams at 378, 346 S.E.2d at 665;
Bishop at 379, 311 S.E.2d at 298.
27. This hypothetical is based on a compilation of facts from various en-
croachment cases.
28. Annotation, Injunction Against Trespasses, 60 A.L.R. 2d 310, 316 (1958).
29. See Note, Balancing the Equities, 18 TEx. L. REV. 412 (1939).
30. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14 (1978).
31. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina Part II. Remedies for Tres-
pass. 47 N.C.L. REv. 334, 359 (1969) [hereinafter Dobbs, Remedies].
32. BLACKS, supra note 17, at 130.
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money damages if the encroachment was an innocent mistake.33
Courts will deny equitable relief if the encroachment is slight com-
pared with the injury to the defendant if he has to remove it. 34
Sometimes the doctrine is expressed as a "balance of conve-
nience"." This does not properly set forth the weighing process or
state the correct test.36 An injunction is not granted merely be-
cause of the advantage to the plaintiff or denied because of the
convenience to the defendant.3 7 The problem is one of relative
hardships and the court must balance all the equities of the situa-
tion.38 The policies which uphold ownership rights and the unique-
ness of real property give way to other public policies in balancing
the equities.3 9
"Injunctive relief against violation of the obligation arising out
of a promise respecting the use of land will be denied if the harm
done by granting the injunction will be disproportionate to the
benefit secured thereby. '4 0 Many courts have taken this position."
These courts consider the relative hardships of the parties where
removal of the encroachment would cause damage to the defend-
ant disproportionate to the plaintiff's injury.2 The disproportion
between the harm to the defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff
must be of considerable magnitude when it is the basis for refusing
injunctive relief.' 3 For example, a defendant builds an apartment
building which encroaches several inches on a plaintiff's vacant lot.
If the defendant is compelled to remove the structure, the expense
and difficulty of removal will be great. However, if the structure is
allowed to remain, the encroachment will cause little damage to
the plaintiff and its removal will result in little benefit. Here, the
disproportion between the harm to the defendant and the benefit
to the plaintiff will be of considerable magnitude. An injunction
will not issue simply because the defendant's injury will be greater
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 comment a (1979).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (Including the relative hardships to the parties, the interest of third
parties, and the interests of the general public).
39. For a complete discussion of public policy, see infra notes 113-34 and
accompanying text.
40. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944).
41. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 133 (1962).
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 40, § 563 comment c.
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than the plaintiffs benefit if the injunction is denied." On the
other hand, the court will not refuse an injunction merely because
of the convenience it would give to the defendant."
In some jurisdictions a mandatory injunction to compel re-
moval will not issue where the burden on the defendant outweighs
the injury or benefit to the plaintiff.' 6 There are other cases where
the courts will not grant injunctive relief if the encroachment
comes within the "de minimus" rule.'7 Relief may be denied where
the granting of an injunction places an undue hardship on the de-
fendant.48 This is especially relevant where preliminary injunctions
are an issue. 9 "In determining the propriety of issuing an interloc-
utory injunction, the hearing judge considers and weighs the rela-
tive conveniences and inconveniences .... "50 An injunction will
not issue "where its issuance would confer little benefit on the
plaintiff and cause great inconvenience to the defendant. ' 51 Subse-
quent damages caused by the encroachment are or can be reme-
died by a mandatory injunction to compel removal in the final dis-
position by the court at a trial on the merits of the case.52
A plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages when a defend-
ant's hardship is found disproportionate to the injury suffered by
the plaintiff and injunctive relief is denied.53 The defendant must
compensate the plaintiff for the value of the property.5' Upon pay-
ment, the defendant acquires either a fee simple title or permanent
easement to the land on which the encroachment is located.55 The
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35.
45. Id.
46. Annotation, Mandatory Injunction to Compel Removal of Encroach-
ments by Adjoining Landowners, 28 A.L.R. 2d 679 (1953).
47. Id. The rule is based on the maxim "De minimus non curat lex"; the law
is not concerned with trifles. A minority of courts usually refuse to grant an in-
junction where the defendant acted in good faith, the damage to plaintiff is mini-
mal, and removal would place a tremendous hardship on the defendant and would
result in little benefit to plaintiff. Id.
48. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 358.
49. Id. North Carolina courts to date have applied the relative hardship doc-
trine only in cases where preliminary injunctions were an issue and only in these
cases was injunctive relief denied. See Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, Inc., 238 N.C.
357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953); Lance v. Codgill, 238 N.C. 500, 78 S.E.2d 319 (1953).
50. Huskins, at 361, 78 S.E.2d at 120.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 356.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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plaintiff can, if he wishes, restrict the defendant's interest in the
property. 6 The defendant's interest can be limited to a conditional
easement so that the land will revert to the plaintiff in the event
anything happens to the structure."7
In encroachment cases the invasion of property rights is al-
ways an issue. 58 The issue exists whether the encroachment is in-
nocent or willful and intentional.59 If the encroachment is inten-
tional, the defendant should be punished so the conduct will not
be repeated.60 In the case of an innocent defendant, the court
should consider the relative hardships of the parties and issue or
deny an injunction as the balance indicates.6 1 "There would cer-
tainly be little equity in a doctrine that an injury could not be pre-
vented if the one who was commiting the wrong would greatly
profit by it, and the doctrine that equity may balance the hard-
ships involved should be rejected if it means only that it will weigh
the respective pecuniary injuries."62
B. Factors Evaluated
The doctrine of relative or comparative hardship is invoked
when a landowner seeks equitable relief against an adjoining land-
owner who has encroached on his property. 3 "Where the encroach-
ment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional taking
of another's land, equity may well require its restoration . . ." re-
gardless of the relative hardships of the parties." "Where the en-
croachment was in good faith . . . the court should weigh the cir-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 350. The interest at issue in encroachment cases in not financial. It
is an interest in the exclusive possession and right of quiet enjoyment. Monetary
damages cannot replace nor restore these interests when the invasion is perma-
nent in nature and will continue in fact unless it is abated. Id.
59. See, e.g., Terry v. Jim Walter Corp., 8 N.C. App. 637, 175 S.E.2d 354
(1970) (holding plaintiff could elect to keep the encroaching structure on the land
or demand its removal despite the fact that defendant acted in good faith and did
not encroach willfully or intentionally).
60. Annotation, supra note 46, at 685 (One who intentionally or willfully en-
croaches on another's land does so at his own peril).
61. Golden Press v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 126, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (1951).
62. H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 145 (1948).
63. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.6.
64. Golden Press, at 122, 235 P.2d at 595. (holding plaintiff should be com-
pensated due to defendant's intentional wrongdoing despite the fact that defend-
ant's encroachment was only three inches).
1989]
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cumstances so it shall not act oppressively."6
Before the relative hardship doctrine will apply, the court
must first find that the defendant made an innocent mistake.
66
" '[I]t is of great importance to see if defendant knew he was doing
wrong and was taking his chances about being disturbed in doing
it.' ,,A7 An innocent mistake is one made by a person who does not
have notice he is invading another's property rights.68 An innocent
mistake also occurs when the person had notice but made a good
faith error which resulted in slight damage to another's property.6 9
The burden of proving innocence is upon the defendant and car-
ries a higher standard of proof than nonwillfulness which places
the burden upon the plaintiff.70 Once the defendant overcomes his
burden of proof and establishes his innocence, the court will bal-
ance all of the equities between the parties before issuing or deny-
ing an injunction.71
In balancing the equities, courts should consider the relative
hardships to the parties including the character of the conduct,
property interest affected, and relative interests of each party. 2
Although the court "must consider the peculiar equities of the
case," there is "no specific and universally accepted rule as to en-
croachments." 3 Some jurisdictions take the position that an in-
junction should be denied if the encroachment was unintentional
and there was only slight or no material damage to the plaintiff.
7 4
Other jurisdictions take the position that the amount of damage
suffered by the plaintiff is irrelevant and is an insufficient reason
to deny injunctive relief.L75
Jurisdictions which consider the relative hardships of the par-
ties balance the hardship to the defendant against injury to the
plaintiff.76 The economic hardship which would result from the
granting of an injunction must greatly outweigh the injury to the
65. Id.
66. Norfolk Southern R.R. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 F. 546, (E.D.N.C. 1920).
67. Id. at 574 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 20 L.R. 500 (1875)).
68. Note, Comparative Hardship Doctrine Applied in Easement Action, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 709, 711 (1981).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 62, § 144.
73. Golden Press v. Rylands 124 Colo. at 125-26, 235 P.2d 592, 594-95 (1951)
74. 1 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 41.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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plaintiff." When the economic hardship to the defendant would
impose a burden slightly disproportionate to the plaintiff's, the
hardship to the defendant would not be sufficient to deprive the
plaintiff of an injunction.7 8 This is especially true where the de-
fendant proceeded to build without benefit of a survey or had no-
tice but made a good faith error.7 9 The plaintiff's interest must not
be overshadowed by the hardship the defendant would suffer if an
injunction was granted in balancing the relative hardships.8 0 The
decision should be based not on what the plaintiff will gain if equi-
table relief is granted but on the hardship he will be forced to en-
dure if it is denied."
The defendant is the wrongdoer in an encroachment case
whether his conduct was innocent or intentional.2 The problem
exists because he was either ignorant of the situation, knew but did
not care, or made an honest mistake.8 3 The defendant must prove
his intent and conduct were innocent before the court will consider
additional relevant factors. 4 The defendant, however, is but one of
the parties to an encroachment case. The conduct of the plaintiff
must also be considered. 5 If the character of the plaintiff's con-
duct is inequitable, although not illegal, it will weigh against the
plaintiff. 6 The equities which the court will consider in opposing
an injunction include misleading conduct by the plaintiff, prejudi-
cial delay in asserting his rights, and coming before a court of eq-
uity with unclean hands.8 In balancing these equities, the court
may find the plaintiff is partially responsible for the hardships the
defendant will suffer if an injunction is granted.8
Property rights are the real issue in encroachment cases.8 9 The
property interests which will be affected must be considered. The
courts will properly consider the property rights of each party and
the effect granting or denying an injunction will have on the re-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, comment c.
81. Id.
82. Id. comment b.
83. Id.
84. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.6.
85. DOBBS, Remedies, supra note 31, at 358.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, comment b.
89. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 311.
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spective rights of each party."' In encroachment cases the amount
of property actually affected is generally small in terms of the land
invaded.9 1 A substantial building constructed with a corner of the
building partially on an adjoining landowner's vacant lot is repre-
sentative of the amount and type of property interests involved.2
Other examples include foundations which cross the property line
a fraction of a foot or structures with eaves which overhang several
inches on the adjoining landowner's property.9 3 In each of these
examples, the property of the wronged landowner is rendered only
slightly less valuable. Consider, however, the effect an injunction to
compel removal would have on the defendant. An injunction would
prevent the defendant from using his property, the building, for its
only valuable purpose."' Courts can decline to order removal of an
encroachment when the plaintiff's property rights and land value
are only slightly affected by an encroachment and the defendant's
rights would be substantially affected if the structure had to be
moved.9 5
One of the underlying policy considerations in encroachment
cases is the unique and priceless quality of land.9 6 The courts,
therefore, consider the relative interests which will be lost by
whatever action is taken. 7 If an injunction is denied, the plaintiff
will be forced to accept monetary damages as just compensation
for the land taken by the encroachment.9 8 A plaintiff who does not
want to lose title to the land may request the court to grant the
90. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 62, § 144.
91. For examples of the amount of land involved, see supra note 15.
92. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (building encroached fifty feet); Williams v. South & South Rentals,
Inc., 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986) (building encroached one foot);
Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. review denied,
310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984) (house encroached fifty feet).
93. See, e.g. Golden Press v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951).
94. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 62, § 144.
95. Note, supra note 68, at 709.
96. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 354 At common law property is held
to be unique. No two parcels of land are identical. When a seller breaches a con-
tract for the sale of land, the buyer can request and the court will enforce specific
performance of the contract. The court will grant a mandatory injunction to com-
pel removal for the same reasons it will grant specific performance of a contract -
to protect the peculiar nature of the right and subject matter invaded. R. CUN-
NINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.5 (1984).
97. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 62, § 144.
98. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 367.
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defendant an easement with a reversionary provision.9 In the
event the defendant's structure ceases to exist, the land will revert
to the plaintiff.100 The defendant will be granted either an ease-
ment to the land or a fee simple title.10' The interest the defendant
receives will depend upon the interest the plaintiff decides to con-
vey.102 In addition, the defendant will pay fair market value for the
land interest he acquires. 03 If an injunction is granted, the defend-
ant will be compelled to remove the structure. 04 He will have to
pay the plaintiff for any damages caused by the encroachment it-
self or by removal of the encroachment.'05 The plaintiff's property
interest will be vindicated, and the defendant will be punished at
great cost to himself. The defendant is at a great disadvantage,
although one of his own making, and usually the plaintiff is aware
of this. For this reason, most mandatory injunctions are for sale.'0 6
The plaintiff will demand enforcement of the mandatory injunc-
tion only if the defendant does not come up with the right price for
the land in question.10 7
"[A] case can hardly occur in which land of more than mone-
tary value is seriously threatened by a substantial encroach-
ment." 108 A landowner who considers his land or homesite priceless
is not going to sit idly by and watch someone build a sizeable
structure partially on his land without objecting before the struc-
ture is completed. 0 9 If a landowner observes and does nothing,
courts may interpret this to mean the landowner does not think
the property priceless and that money damages are an adequate
remedy."0 There is only one situation in which this theory would
not apply. It occurs when a landowner lives out of state or is away
from home for an extended period of time and returns to find a
completed structure encroaching on his property."' It may be un-
just to make a landowner sell his land at a price set by the court if
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 369.
104. Terry v. Jim Walter Corp. 8 N.C. App. 637, 175 S.E.2d 354 (1979).
105. Id.
106. Note, supra note 29, at 416.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 414-15.
111. Id. at 415.
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he does not want to part with it at any price. Would a landowner
who values his land so highly stand by and watch someone else
build on it?112
C. Policy Considerations
Encroachment cases present special problems for the courts. A
situation is created which could result in a private eminent domain
by the defendant or in extortion by the plaintiff."' A hypothetical
can best illustrate this point. The true landowner plaintiff, Top,
had a vacant lot he purchased for investment purposes. Top no-
ticed Ed, the encroaching defendant, building a warehouse on the
adjoining land. Top also noticed the building's foundation ap-
peared to be on or just over the dividing line between the property.
The nearer the building drew to completion, the more certain Top
became that the building encroached upon his property. He never
spoke with Ed about his suspicions. Several years later Ed had the
property surveyed for business reasons. The survey revealed the
building was four inches over the property line. Ed went to Top,
told him about the problem, and offered to pay fair market value
for the land. Top immediately saw the potential for selling the
land far above its worth. He told Ed he could purchase the four
inch strip of land for ten thousand dollars. At this point neither
party had clear marketable title to his respective property. To
clear his title defect, Ed could either elect to pay the amount re-
quested or remove the portion of his building which extended be-
yond the boundary line. Top also had a choice. He could either
settle the dispute out of court or demand a mandatory injunction
to compel removal.
Two central policy considerations are illustrated by the hypo-
thetical. Denial of an injunction is a license to private eminent do-
main, and extortion is sanctioned if the injunction is granted." 4
First, no individual should be allowed to take the land of another
simply because he is willing to pay for it. This is a type of private
eminent domain. 115 Allowing private eminent domain sets a prece-
dent. It could conceivably lead land developers and others to think
they can acquire property by intentionally encroaching on an-
112. Id. at 414.
113. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.6.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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other's land."1 6 This would be an unwise precedent to set, but con-
sider the position of the defendant who innocently encroaches on
his neighbor's land. Is this defendant to suffer the hardships which
result from an injunction compelling removal when he had no in-
tent to take land which was not his?
The second policy consideration is that extortion cannot be
sanctioned by the courts."17 The nature of the trespass and the op-
tions available to the encroaching defendant place the wrongdoer
in an untenable position. In effect, he is caught between a rock and
a hard place. Regardless of his intentions, the defendant is the
wrongdoer, and the plaintiff is very much aware of this fact. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff can be expected to compromise
for an extortionate figure when the defendant's only alternative is
the threat of a court issued injunction to compel removal."'
A middle ground is needed so that neither party can take un-
due advantage of the other. An objective standard for determining
the issuance or denial of an injunction would alleviate the possibil-
ity of extortion by the plaintiff or an intentional taking by the de-
fendant. The equitable hardship doctrine provides a standard by
which the equities of the parties are balanced. ' 19 Under this doc-
trine, one who intentionally encroaches on another's land will not
be allowed to right his wrong by simply paying damages.1i 0 If the
encroachment is intentional, the plaintiff will prevail, and an in-
junction will lie.' The defendant will be forced to remove the en-
croachment and pay damages. 122 This will be sufficient punishment
to warn others against such intentional acts. If the encroachment is
innocent, courts will consider the equities of both parties. The de-
fendant gets an opportunity to prove his innocence and to save his
property interests.22 The plaintiff gets just compensation for his
property. He can elect to retain a reversionary interest in the
land.124 Application of the relative hardship doctrine lessens the
possibility of the extremes. The threat of an injunction is lessened
and, with it, the possibility of extortion. However, extortion re-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35.
120. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 367.
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mains a policy consideration in the case of intentional encroach-
ments. One who intentionally encroaches on another's land does so
at his own peril. 25 He places himself at the mercy of the plaintiff
and the courts. He will ultimately be punished by one or the other
for his wrongdoing.
One of the underlying reasons for granting mandatory injunc-
tions to compel removal is punishment.12 One who does wrong
should not escape punishment simply because he is willing and ca-
pable of paying for his wrongdoing. A mandatory injunction to
compel removal not only vindicates the plaintiff, it also punishes
the defendant. 12 7 Punishing the defendant serves two purposes.
One purpose is to make the defendant pay for the wrong he has
done. 28 The other purpose is to serve as a general deterrent.1 29
Theoretically, granting injunctions against encroachments will dis-
courage similar wrongdoing by others."'0 An alternative to injunc-
tive relief would be to allow the plaintiff to recover both compensa-
tory and punitive damages."1 However, this is not possible in all
jurisdictions.1 32 In some jurisdictions a mandatory injunction is the
only available device for discouraging intentional encroachments
because punitive damages are not allowed.1 33
A mandatory injunction is sufficient punishment to discourage
intentional encroachments. However, the deterrent factor is not
applicable when the encroachment is accidental. 13 The defendant
who invaded the plaintiff's property by accident or mistake had no
intent to take property which he did not own. The punishment for
intentional and accidental encroachments is the same, however, if
the relative hardship doctrine is not applied. 3 5 An innocent de-
fendant is forced to remove the encroachment and pay any dam-
ages caused by the removal. He is punished severely for an inno-
cent mistake, and the deterrent factor serves no useful purpose.
Protection of property rights is a policy consideration in any
125. Annotation, supra note 46, at 685.
126. Note, supra note 29, at 415.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 417.
129. Id. at 412-13.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 416.
132. Id. at 416-17.
133. Id. at 417.
134. Id. at 414.
135. Id. at 413.
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encroachment case.13 6 When the encroachment is accidental and
the relative hardship doctrine is applied, the defendant must over-
come this policy which is more concerned with the protection of
the plaintiff's property rights than with the hardships the defend-
ant will suffer if an injunction is granted.137 The courts are more
concerned with the protection of individual rights than with the
profits that inure to the parties as a result of the invasion of those
rights. 13  The defendant's hardship must overcome the plaintiff's
injury and the policy which protects the plaintiff's property rights
before an injunction will be denied.
NORTH CAROLINA COURTS AND THE RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE
A. Overview
Except where title is an issue, there is little evidence that
North Carolina courts consider the relative adequacy of a legal
remedy where equitable relief is requested in encroachment
cases.139 A remedy at law is consistently found to be inadequate. 4 0
North Carolina courts grant mandatory injunctions to compel re-
moval without reluctance when requested by the plaintiff.'
An injunction is an equitable remedy. " 2 Courts should con-
sider the relative hardships of the parties and the equities between
them where equity has jurisdiction. 4 3 North Carolina courts have
applied the equitable hardship doctrine only in cases where the re-
lief requested was a temporary restraining order or interlocutory
injunction. " The courts discussed, but did not directly deal with,
the doctrine and its application in cases where a mandatory injunc-
tion was at issue.141 This paper presents a brief summary of North
136. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 62, § 144.
137. Id. § 145.
138. Id.
139. See, Conrad v. Jones, 31 N.C. App. 75, 228 S.E.2d 618 (1976).
140. See O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937); Williams v.
South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986); Bishop v. Rein-
hold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. reivew denied, 310 N.C. 743,
315 S.E.2d 700 (1984); Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 58 N.C. App. 506, 294
S.E.2d 23 (1982); Thompson v. Hayes, 17 N.C App. 216, 193 S.E.2d 488 (1972);
Terry v. Jim Walter Corp., 8 N.C. App. 637, 175 S.E.2d 354 (1970).
141. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 358.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 367.
145. Id.
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Carolina decisions which have addressed the relative hardship doc-
trine. This paper then examines why the doctrine has been applied
to temporary injunctions but not to mandatory or permanent
injunctions.
B. Opinions of the Court -
Very few appellate opinions address or deal with the relative
hardship doctrine in encroachment cases. A brief summary of these
opinions follows.
1. Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, Inc.""
The encroaching structure was a driveway used by ambulances
at a hospital.14 The plaintiff and the defendant owned adjoining
property.4 8 The driveway was located on a narrow strip of land
near the boundary line between the property.4 9 The plaintiff's lot
was vacant. 50 The driveway was the only practical route for pa-
tients to be driven to the hospital for admittance and discharge.' 51
The defendant's predecessor in title originally established the
driveway.15 2 The defendant excavated the strip of land in order to
remodel and pave the drive.8 3 After the paving was completed, the
plaintiff brought an action in trespass and alleged the defendant
was trespassing on his land and would continue to trespass unless
he was enjoined.1 54 The plaintiff requested an interlocutory injunc-
tion and prayed for a mandatory injunction and damages after a
trial on the merits. 55 The trial court issued a temporary re-
straining order until the propriety of an interlocutory injunction
could be determined. 56 The court later denied an interlocutory in-
junction. 157 The plaintiff challenged the validity of the order.'58
146. 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
147. Id. at 358, 78 S.E.2d at 118.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 358, 78 S.E.2d at 118.
151. Id. at 363, 78 S.E.2d at 121.
152. Id. at 358, 78 S.E.2d at 118.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 358, 78 S.E.2d at 118.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 359, 78 S.E.2d at 119.
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On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the order of the lower
court which refused to issue an interlocutory injunction."5 9 The
court stated that the hearing judge considers and weighs the rela-
tive hardships the parties will suffer by the granting of the writ in
determining the propriety of its issuance. 160 The court further
stated that an interlocutory injunction against a trespass should be
denied where its issuance would confer little benefit to the plaintiff
and cause great hardship to the defendant."6 ' The relative hard-
ship doctrine was operative in this case. The supreme court held
that, based on the proofs of the parties, the granting of an interloc-
utory injunction against the defendant under the circumstances
would result in no benefit to the plaintiff but would result in great
hardship to the defendant.16 2 The plaintiff had no present use for
the land in question, but continued use by the defendant was es-
sential to the operation of the hospital. 63 Denial of an interlocu-
tory injunction was proper.6
2. Lance v. Cogdill'6 5
The court applied the relative hardship doctrine in this case to
determine whether a temporary restraining order should be contin-
ued."'66 The plaintiff alleged the defendant set off large explosions
of dynamite which blasted rocks upon his property and made the
property unsafe for occupancy.' The plaintiff further alleged he
suffered great and irreparable damage which would continue as
long as the defendant continued to blast with explosives.6 8 The
plaintiff owned a one-half undivided interest in 109 acres of land
which was adjacent to the leasehold estate upon which the defend-
ant's rock quarry was located.'69 The plaintiff brought a civil ac-
tion to enjoin the defendant from further blasting and for damages
caused by rocks which covered many acres of the plaintiff's land. 7 '
159. Id. at 363, 78 S.E.2d at 122.
160. Id. at 361-62, 78 S.E.2d at 120.
161. Id. at 362, 78 S.E.2d at 120.
162. Id. at 363, 78 S.E.2d at 121-22.
163. Id. at 363, 78 S.E.2d at 121.
164. Id. at 363, 78 S.E.2d at 121.
165. 238 N.C. 500, 78 S.E.2d 319 (1953).
166. Id. at 504, 78 S.E.2d at 322.
167. Id. at 502, 78 S.E.2d at 320.
168. Id. at 501-02, 78 S.E.2d at 320.
169. Id. at 501, 78 S.E.2d at 320.
170. Id.
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The court entered a temporary restraining order. 1 7 At a later hear-
ing the order was dissolved upon a showing of cause by the defend-
ant why the order should not have been continued to final hear-
ing. 1 72 The plaintiff, appealed. 17 3
The supreme court affirmed the dissolution of the restraining
order and stated the general' rule which should be applied in deter-
mining whether to grant an injunction. 74 The court stated that it
is the duty of the trial court to consider the relative hardships of
the parties before granting or denying injunctive relief.'", The
court further reasoned that the rule applies in determining
whether to continue a temporary restraining order.77 The supreme
court presumed that the lower court's judgment was correct, and
that the lower court, in exercising its discretion considered the rel-
ative equities of the parties.'77 Therefore, the lower court's ruling
on the issue was not disturbed.'78
3. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc.17 9
The plaintiffs requested a mandatory injunction to compel the
removal of waste materials. 80 The defendant's highway project
damaged the plantiff's property.' 8 ' In specific, the plantiff's alleged
their property was damaged by the defendant's deposits of rock
waste material on property adjacent to, near to, or on their prop-
erty. 82 The plaintiffs prayed for a mandatory injunction and pecu-
niary damages and, in the alternative compensation for the inter-
est in land taken by the defendant.'83
At trial, the plaintiffs elected to pursue an equitable remedy
instead of damages.8 The trial court found the plaintiffs were en-
titled to a judgment against the defendant because the acts of the
171. Id. at 502, 78 S.E.2d at 321.
172. Id. at 503, 78 S.E.2d at 321.
173. Id. at 502-03, 78 S.E.2d at 321.
174. Id. at 504, 78 S.E.2d at 322.
175. Id. at 504, 78 S.E.2d at 322.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 316 N.C. 475, 342 S.E.2d 832 (1986).
180. Id. at 479, 342 S.E.2d at 834.
181. Id. at 478, 342 S.E.2d at 834.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 479, 342 S.E.2d at 834.
184. Id. at 482, 342 S.E.2d at 836.
[Vol. 12:71
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss1/3
RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE
defendant were not for a proper public purpose.' 85 The trial court
further found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm for
which there was no adequate remedy at law if the defendant was
allowed to continue.186 The court ordered the defendant to remove
all the waste material from the plaintiffs' property and to discon-
tuinue its nonconforming use.8 7 The defendant appealed.""8
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court
on the issue of the propriety of allowing a motion for summary
judgment. " The court, in dicta, addressed the mandatory injunc-
tion issue. 9 ' The court stated there was evidence that removal of
the waste would take nine years at a cost of $13,500,000.00 to the
defendant.' 9 ' The court further held that the lower court made no
findings on this evidence, and, in this case, findings of fact should
be made before ordering removal of the material. 92 The lower
court must consider the relative hardships and comparative inju-
ries to the parties before determining whether to grant or deny an
injunction.'93
The Supreme Court granted the defendants petition for dis-
cretinary review."' The supreme court held that substantial issues
of material fact existed which precluded summary judgment. 9"
The holding of the court of appeals was modified and affirmed.1 96
The supreme court, again in dicta, addressed the mandatory in-
junction issue. 97 The court stated that, because the plaintiffs
elected to pursue only a remedy of injunctive relief, the case must
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. ' 98 The
court then stated, "[W]e find it worthwhile to repeat the caution-
ary statement of the Court of Appeals ..... "0 The court reiter-
185. Id. at 483, 342 S.E.2d at 836.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 483, 342 S.E.2d at 836.
189. Id. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 769.
190. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 72 N.C. App. 143, 323 S.E.2d 765
(1984).
191. Id. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 768.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 769.
194. Clark, 316 N.C. at 484, 342 S.E.2d at 837.
195. Id. at 488. 342 S.E.2d at 839.
196. Clark, 316 N.C. at 488, 342 S.E.2d at 839.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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ated the court of appeals' statement that the relative hardships
and injuries of the parties should be considered before determining
whether to issue a mandatory injunction. 00 In the case at hand,
findings of fact should be made before ordering the defendant to
remove the waste.20 Here, the defendant's encroachment was not
intentional, and the deposits of waste materials were substantial."'
To comply with the court's issuance of a mandatory injunction, the
defendant would be forced to remove from 1,300,000 to 1,500,000
cubic yards of waste materials. 03 It would take nine years to re-
move the rock deposits at a cost of $13,500,000.00 to defendant.2 4
4. Williams v. South & South Rentals, Inc.2 °5
The defendant built a two-story brick apartment building, the
corner of which encroached eleven inches on the plaintiff's prop-
erty.206 At the time the building was constructed, neither party
knew of the encroachment.20 7 Nine years after construction the de-
fendant had the land surveyed. 08 The survey revealed the en-
croachement, making it clear that the defendant did not have clear
marketable title.2 0 9 The defendant went to the plaintiff and told
him about the encroachment.210 The defendant told the plaintiff he
did not want any problems with the title.21 ' The plaintiff re-
sponded by telling the defendant he could purchase the adjoining
property for $45,000.00.212 The plaintiff's property was an oddly
shaped tract of land which was located substantially in a creek bed
and consisted of one-fourth to one-third acre. 21' The defendant re-
fused to purchase the land for $45,000.00, so the plaintiff brought
an action in trespass and requested a mandatory injunction to
200. Id.- at 488.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 381, 342 S.E.2d at 835.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 481, 342 S.E.2d at 835.
205. 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986).
206. Id. at 378, 346 S.E.2d at 666.
207. Id. at 379, 346 S.E.2d at 667.
208. Brief for Appellee at 4, Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C.
App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986) (No. 8524 SC 1219).
209. Id.
210. Williams, 82 N.C. App. at 379, 346 S.E.2d at 666.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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compel removal.1 4
The lower court found the encroachment was a continuing
trespass and applied the statute of limitations governing continu-
ing trespasses.21' The court found that the statute of limitations
barred the action because the complaint was filed nine years after
the original trespass.2 16 The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim,
and the plaintiff appealed. 17
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
lower court's judgment.21 8 The court held that the action was not
barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff requested
a permanent remedy which was subject to the twenty-year statute
of limitations for adverse possession. 19 The court stated that the
usual remedy for a continuing trespass is a permanent injunction
which, in the instant case, would be a mandatory injunction to
compel removal.2
In its opinion, the court of appeals discussed the relative hard-
ship doctrine and the underlying policy considerations which are
eliminated by the doctrine.221 The court stated, "[T]here may be
situations . . . where sufficient public interests exist to make the
right of abatement at the instance of an individual improper, and
defendant should be permitted to demand that permanent dam-
ages be awarded. 2 22 The court then held, "We are compelled by
this Court's prior holding in Bishop v. Reinhold to hold that since
the encroachment and continuing trespass have been established
and since defendant is not a quasi-public entity, plaintiff is enti-
tled as a matter of law to the relief prayed for, namely removal of
the encroachment. 223 The court remanded the case to the lower
court for entry of a mandatory injunction.22'
The prior holding in Bishop 2 5 is based on facts clearly distin-
214. Id. at 379, 346 S.E.2d at 666.
215. Id. at 380, 346 S.E.2d at 667.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 384, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
219. Id. at 382, 346 S.E.2d at 668.
220. Id. at 383, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
221. Id. at 384, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
222. Id. at 384-85, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
223. Id. at 384, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
224. Id.
225. Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. re-
view denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984).
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guishable from the instant case. In Bishop,226 the defendant built a
house partially on the plaintiff's land. Originally, the defendant
conveyed the land to the plaintiff.227 According to one of the trial
witnesses, the encroachment was so obvious it could be detected by
the naked eye.228 Surely, if an objective third party could detect
the encroachment, the defendant knew or should have known he
was building on the wrong property. During the time of construc-
tion, the plaintiff was serving as an officer in the United States Air
Force and was stationed in various places. 22' The plaintiff returned
to the location of his property for the purpose of putting it on the
market for sale.280 Only after the plaintiff had the land surveyed at
the request of a prospective buyer did he learn of the encroach-
ment.2"' The trial court found no mutual mistake between the par-
ties and no mistake in the survey as the defendant alleged.23 2
Based on the facts of the case and the court's holding, one can
presume that the defendant either intentionally or negligently en-
croached on the plaintiff's property. In encroachment cases, the
courts treat negligent and intentional encroachments the same.2 33
The courts find a remedy at law inadequate and issue a mandatory
injunciton to compel removal.234
Basing the holding in Williams on the prior holding in Bishop
because the encroachments were both continuing trespasses and
the defendants were not quasi-public entities was not a logical ra-
tionale. The court in Williams should have considered additional
factors, and it should have applied the relative hardship doctrine.
Justice Webb wrote a dissenting opinion in Williams in which he
disagreed with the court's reasoning that the plaintiff was entitled
to a mandatory injunction as a matter of law based on the fact that
226. Id.
227. Id. at 381, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
228. Id. at 382, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
229. Id. at 381, 311 S.E.2d at 299.
230. Id. at 381, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
231. Id. at 381-82, 311 S.E.2d at 300.
232. Id. at 389, 311 S.E.2d at 304.
233. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.6.
234. Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N.C.
511, 515, 11 S.E. 24, 25 (1922) (quoting Broome v. Tel. Co., 42 N.J. Eq. 141 (1887)
stating that "Where there is a deliberate, unlawful, and inexcusable invasion by
one of another's land . . ., and there has been neither acquiescence nor delay in
applying to the court for relief, the mere fact that the trespass was complete when
the bill was filed will not prevent an injunction . . .").
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the defendant was not a quasi-public entity. 35 Justice Webb
stated that the rule in Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc.23 6
governed in the instant case.23 7 Justice Webb set forth the Clark
rule as follows; "In determining whether to grant an injunction, the
court must consider the relative convenience - inconvenience and
the comparative injuries to the parties. 2 38
C. Analysis
Where plaintiffs requested preliminary injunctions the courts
applied the relative hardship doctrine. The courts did not apply
the doctrine where mandatory injunctions were at issue. Why?
Did the fact that the hardship defendant would suffer if an injunc-
tion was granted make it easier to justify the withholding of an
interlocutory injunction as opposed to a mandatory injunction? Or,
did the temporary character of the relief sought make the applica-
tion of the doctrine more feasible when preliminary injunctions
were requested?
Preliminary injunctions are granted to preserve the status quo
of the parties until there is a trial on the merits, while mandatory
injunctions are granted after a trial on the merits.23 9 Why invoke
the relative hardship doctrine in the former and not the latter
when both are equitable remedies? The general rule is that where
equity has jurisdiction the relative hardships of the parties and the
equities between them should be considered before granting or de-
nying injunctive relief.240
The only logical rationale for applying the doctrine in one sit-
uation and not the other is the permanency of the decision. A pre-
liminary injunction is temporary, and the parties are entitled to a
trial on the merits to determine the final disposition of the issues.
A mandatory injunction is a final judgment issued after a trial on
the merits. Where a preliminary injunction is requested there is no
235. Williams, 82 N.C. App. at 384, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
236. 316 N.C. 475, 342 S.E.2d 832 (1986).
237. Id. at 385, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
238. Id. In a telephone interview, the attorney of record for the defendant
was asked why the case was not appealed to the supreme court. The attorney's
response was that it was a matter of economics. The case was settled out of court
after it was remanded on appeal. The defendant purchased the land in dispute for
several thousand dollars. Telephone interview with Chester E. Whittle, Jr., Attor-
ney for Defendant-Appellee (July 19, 1987).
239. See Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
240. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 358.
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chance the defendant will acquire an easement in or title to the
plaintiff's property until there is a trial on the merits. It would be
interesting to know whether the courts applied the relative hard-
ship doctrine in preliminary injunction cases at a trial on the mer-
its. An educated guess would be no.
RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE - AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD
Jurisdictions which take the position that a legal remedy is
inadequate to protect the plaintiff's property interest grant injunc-
tive relief without great reluctance."" A relatively slight injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff compared to a great hardship suffered by the
defendant is deemed an insufficient reason to deny a mandatory
injunction.242 This rationale is based on a public policy which is
more concerned with the protection of an individual's property
rights than the pecuniary interest suffered by denial of an injunc-
tion.24 Denial of injunctive relief allows the defendant to acquire
an interest in the plaintiffs property to which he has no right. This
amounts to a type of eminent domain which sets an unwise prece-
dent for future litigation.2 ' Granting injunctive relief, however, vin-
dicates the plaintiff, punishes the defendant, and serves as a deter-
rent to others.245
It is an established fact that an individual who encroaches on
another's land is a trespasser." He places himself in an untenable
position of his own making. Whether the encroachment is inten-
tional or accidental, the defendant is still guilty of invading the
property interests of another individual. A mandatory injunction
vindicates the plaintiff and punishes the defendant regardless of
the defendant's intent, or lack of intent, to take the plaintiff's
land.247 Is justice served when one who encroaches accidentally is
judged by the same standard as one who encroaches intentionally?
A defendant who builds on another's land through innocence or
error will not make the same mistake again. He has no intent to
241. Id.
242. 1 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 41, § 133.
243. D. DOBBS, supra note 18, § 5.4.
244. Id. at 355.
245. Note, supra note 29, at 415.
246. Dobbs, Substantive Law, supra note 21, at 32-33 Encroachment cases
deal with an ancient and simple tort - an illegal intrusion upon land owned or
possessed by another. Id at 31.
247. See, e.g. Terry v. Jim Walter Corp., 8 N.C. App. 637, 175 S.E.2d 354
(1970).
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take property which does not belong to him. Therefore, an injunc-
tion to compel removal does not serve as a deterrent to him or to
others in his position.
Jurisdictions which grant mandatory injunctions because of
the inadequacy of a legal remedy adjudicate cases of intentional
and innocent encroachments in the same manner.2 4 The relative
hardships to the parties and the equities between them, if consid-
ered, are deemed insufficient reasons to deny a plaintiff his prop-
erty rights.24 9 The defendant's intent is irrelevant.2 50 This places
the plaintiff in the position of the devil's advocate. The plaintiff
knows he can ask for injunctive relief and receive it. He also knows
he has the defendant at a complete disadvantage. All the plaintiff
must do is determine how important it is to the defendant to keep
his building intact, and how much the defendant is willing to pay
for the privilege. If the defendant is unwilling or unable to meet
the plaintiff's demand, then the plaintiff reminds him of the alter-
native. Is this extortion? By any standard, yes. Although extortion
is not sanctioned, the basis for it is established where the defend-
ant knows he must pay the plaintiff's price or be compelled to re-
move the structure by court order. In either situation, the defend-
ant who intentionally encroaches receives his just reward. The
defendant who accidentally crosses the boundary line pays dearly
for his mistake.
North Carolina is among the jurisdictions which have consist-
ently held a remedy at law inadequate.2 51 North Carolina courts
grant mandatory injunctions where the encroachment is estab-
lished as a continuing trespass and the defendant is a private citi-
zen.25 2 In North Carolina, all encroachments of permanent struc-
248. Annotation, supra note 46 In encroachment cases, the majority view is
that the landowner does not have an adequate remedy at law; therefore, equity
has jurisdiction. Id.
249. 1 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 41, § 133.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51
S.E.2d 191 (1942); O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937); Leaks-
ville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N.C. 511, 112 S.E. 24
(1922); Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665
(1986); Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. review
denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984).
252. See, e.g., Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co. 316 N.C. 475, 342 S.E.2d
832 (1986); Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665
(1986); Bishop v. Reinhold, 66 N.C. App. 379, 311 S.E.2d 298 (1984), disc. reivew
denied, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 700 (1984).
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tures are characterized as continuing trespasses.253 Few defendants
are quasi-public entities.2 54 The bottom line is that private citizens
who encroach on another's land, whether intentionally or acciden-
tally, are adjudged and penalized in the same manner. The North
Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged this in dicta in a 1986 deci-
sion,255 and it was later addressed in the dissenting opinion of a
1986 court of appeals decision.2 6 Both courts in their respective
opinions stated that the relative hardship doctrine is the proper
rule for determining the issuance or denial of injunctive relief.2 57 In
theory, the courts have acknowledged the doctrine and the propri-
ety of its application in deciding encroachment cases. The courts
have yet to practice what they preach.
There are some situations in which a remedy at law is inade-
quate. There are other situations in which a mandatory injunction
to compel removal can be avoided and the plaintiff provided with
an adequate substitute. An injunction is not issued as a matter of
right.25 8 It is issued at the discretion of the court.259 The relative
hardship doctrine provides a standard by which the court can ob-
jectively decide the fate of the parties and determine whether an
injunction can be avoided and the plaintiff provided with an ade-
quate substitute. Application of the doctrine also eliminates the
extremes of extortion and private eminent domain which are major
policy considerations.
The property rights of the parties will always be of major im-
portance to the courts. However, in encroachment cases, the scale
tips heavily in favor of the plaintiff's rights at the expense of the
defendant. A balance is needed so that neither party suffers un-
justly. The relative hardship doctrine provides that balance. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals made the statement, "There may
be situations where sufficient public interest exists to make the
right of abatement at the instance of an individual improper, and
defendant should be permitted to demand that permanent dam-
253. For a list of cases in which the courts have characterized a permanent
structure as a continuing trespass, see supra note 19.
254. Dobbs, Remedies, supra note 31, at 346.
255. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 316 N.C. 475, 342 S.E.2d 832 (1986).
256. Williams v. South & South Rentals, 82 N.C. App. 378, 346 S.E.2d 665
(1986).
257. Clark at 475, 342 S.E.2d at 832; Williams at 378, 346 S.E.2d at 665.
258. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14 (1978).
259. Id.
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ages be awarded.""" It is time for the courts to put theory into
practice and adopt the relative hardship doctrine as the balancing
standard in encroachment cases.
CONCLUSION
Where property interests have been an issue, the North Caro-
lina courts have held to tradition and have been reluctant to ac-
cept change. Granted, not all change is in the best interests of the
courts or the individuals whose lives are affected by their decisions.
There are changes in the area of encroachment cases, however,
which would allow the courts to protect individual property rights
while avoiding the hardship an injunction would pose.
Over the past few years, North Carolina courts have recog-
nized the relative hardship doctrine as a standard for determining
the issuance or denial of a mandatory injunction to compel re-
moval. Although the courts have not directly dealt with the issue,
the supreme court addressed the propriety of applying the doctrine
in encroachment cases. Now is the time for the courts to make a
change. The foundation has been laid for the adoption of the rela-
tive hardship doctrine by the North Carolina courts as the balanc-
ing standard in encroachment cases.
Olivia Leigh Weeks
260. Williams, 82 N.C. App. at 383, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
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